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Abstract
This Essay briefly reviews the application of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (the “Con-
ventions”) in the so-called war on terror since September 11, 2001 (“9/11”), highlighting a few
current issues of particular interest; notably, the concept of “armed conflict,” the role of Common
Article 3, the impact of the MC Act, screening by “competent tribunals,” and enforcement of the
Conventions in courts martial and against Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”) operatives.
APPLICABILITY OF THE GENEVA
CONVENTIONS TO "ARMED CONFLICT"
IN THE WAR ON TERROR
Miles P. Fischer*
What a roller-coaster ride it has been! Human rights advo-
cates emerged from a black hole of international lawlessness to
the exhilaration of victory in the U.S. Supreme Court's Rasul v.
Bush1 and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld2 decisions in June 2004 and June
2006, only to fall back to political reality upon the adoption of
the Military Commissions Act of 2006' (the "MC Act") in Octo-
ber, 2006. And the ride goes on.
This Essay briefly reviews the application of the Geneva
Conventions of 1949' (the "Conventions") in the so-called war
on terror since September 11, 2001 ("9/11"), highlighting a few
current issues of particular interest; notably, the concept of
"armed conflict," the role of Common Article 3,5 the impact of
the MC Act, screening by "competent tribunals," and enforce-
ment of the Conventions in courts martial and against Central
Intelligence Agency ("CIA") operatives.
Applying the Conventions in the war on terror comes as no
surprise to us now. Yet ten years ago, this title would have
sounded at best odd, at worst irrelevant, to any real concern-
ten years ago, governments had rarely conceived of terrorism as
* Former Chair, Committee on Military Affairs &Justice, Association of the Bar of
the City of New York ("ABCNY Military Committee"); Member, Advisory Board of the
National Institute of Military Justice. The author is in private practice with Wohabe Law
Offices LLP, New York, NY. This Essay is based on a condensed presentation by the
author at Guantanamo, a Colloquium, sponsored by the Stein Center on Law and Ethics,
Fordham University School of Law on November 29, 2006. The views stated herein are
the author's and do not necessarily represent the views of any organization with which
he may be associated.
1. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
2. 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
3. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006).
4. Of the four Conventions, this Essay refers to the Geneva Convention Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (the
"Third Convention" or "GC II") and the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection
of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (the
"Fourth Convention" or "GC IV").
5. It is called "Common Article Three" because it is common to each of the four
Geneva Conventions. See John T. Rawcliffe, Changes to the Department of Defense Law of
War Program, August 2006 ARsy LAw. 23, 25.
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armed conflict or terrorists as combatants. Absent armed con-
flict, the indispensable predicate for the Conventions, they were
simply irrelevant to terrorism.
I. OVERVIEW OF GENEVA CONVENTION ISSUES SINCE 9/11
Soon after 9/11, applicability of the Conventions surfaced
in Afghanistan as an issue in a full-fledged armed conflict con-
ducted with the whole panoply of modern weaponry. The break-
ing news wasn't whether the United States was treating terrorists
as combatants, but that it was not giving effect to the Conven-
tions in extended military operations. The United States took
the nuanced position that the Conventions applied in principle
to the conflict with the Taliban as a defacto State party, though
without conferring prisoner of war ("POW") status on its mem-
bers under Geneva Convention III ("GC III").6 Nor did the Ad-
ministration find GC III to be applicable at all to what it consid-
ered a separate conflict with Al Qaeda, a non-State actor. And
the brief application of Geneva Convention IV ("GC IV") to civil-
ians went largely ignored.7
Thereafter, the Conventions came to the fore during the
invasion of Iraq and the ensuing occupation, when the United
States recognized their application without qualification, al-
though their observance left much to be desired, to put it mildly.
A notable question involved the treatment of security detainees.8
6. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2795. According to the Government, "Hamdan was
captured and detained incident to the conflict with al Qaeda and not the conflict with
the Taliban, and since al Qaeda, unlike Afghanistan is not a 'High Contracting Party'-
i.e., a signatory of the Conventions, the protections of those Conventions are not, it is
argued, applicable to Hamdan." Id.
7. The Fourth Convention, other than Common Article 3, applied in Afghanistan,
in the author's view, only during the invasion and until international recognition of the
Karzai government. In the author's view, there was no occupation of the country within
the meaning of GC IV. If there had been an occupation of the country, the occupying
power would have been NATO or its members whose troops were in Kabul, not the
United States, which never had military control of the capital or an Afghan govern-
ment.
8. Neither the Administration nor Central Command has articulated its under-
standing of permissible "derogation" from GC IV as to "security detainees" during occu-
pation. The provisions of Article 4 of GC IV on security detainees are beyond the scope
of this Essay. Suffice it to say that during occupation, the only derogative effect of
Article 4 is to permit security detainees to be held incommunicado for some period of
time; all other rights, including the right against coercion, continue unabated. See At-
tachment to Letter Dated August 10, 2005, from ABCNY Military Committee to Sens.
Warren and Levin, Armed Services Committee, U.S. Senate (on file with author).
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Attention focused on detainees from the Afghan conflict and,
significantly, from third countries, held at Guantanamo Bay Na-
val Station, Cuba ("Guantanamo") and other locations. Should
these detainees be held as prisoners of war under GC III? Or, if
only Common Article 3 applies rather than the main body of the
Conventions, are the methods of detention, interrogation, and
possible trial by military commission consistent with that Article?
How could the detainees enforce any applicable rights?
The issues arising at Guantanamo led to a series of cases
finding their way to the U.S. Supreme Court, including the Con-
ventions' premiere before the Court in the recent Hamdan deci-
sion.' First, in Rasul, the Court recognized that even non-citi-
zens have a statutory right to habeas corpus at Guantanamo
given exceptional U.S. control of that location. 0 In response,
habeas petitions bloomed like flowers after a desert rainfall.
Then Hamdan was a blockbuster: (a) Common Article 3 applied
to the Afghan conflict with al-Qaeda; 1' and (b) military commis-
sions as then conceived were invalid because they violated Com-
mon Article 312 and, therefore, did not comply with the law of
war as required by the Uniform Code of Military Justice
("UCMJ") .13
Common Article 3 had not been the centerpiece of many
pro-detainee briefs. Some focused on alleged POW status,
others on the statutory law of military commissions or detention,
and a few were constitutional in emphasis. Yet a plurality of the
Court recognized the applicability of at least Common Article 3
in the Afghan conflict and the central role of the Conventions in
the "law of war," as that term is used in the UCMJ with regard to
military commissions. 4 That in turn led to intense congres-
sional attention and finally to legislation in the MC Act.' 5 The
9. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2793-99.
10. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 480-82 (2004).
11. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2794-99.
12. See id. at 2796-99.
13. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2790-99; see also 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-946 (2006). The
UCMJ conditions the President's use of military commissions to try accused combatants
on, inter alia, the Geneva Conventions. See 10 U.S.C. § 821; see also Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at
2786.
14. See Hamdan, 126 S.Ct. at 2785-99; see also 10 U.S.C. § 821.
15. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600
(2006).
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roller coaster went up and then, in the eyes of many, came roar-
ing down.
II. TERRORISM AS ARMED CONFLICT
Throughout this drama the Administration of President
George W. Bush has lost battles, but it may have won a key phase
of the legal war in the characterization of the events. From the
Administration's viewpoint, such controversial questions as
whether Taliban or al-Qaeda detainees are prisoners of war
under the Third Convention or the meaning of non-interna-
tional conflict in Common Article 3 may be highly important,
but they are subject to the overarching view of the entire War on
Terror as "armed conflict." Without that characterization, the
other questions would not even arise: the Conventions, includ-
ing Common Article 3, apply expressly only in "armed conflict,"
the term used in 1949 to replace the outmoded concept of
"war. "16
The 1949 treaties did not define "armed conflict." Accord-
ing to the International Committee of the Red Cross Commentary
edited by Dr. Jean Pictet, "speaking generally, it must be recog-
nized that the conflicts referred to in Article 3 are armed con-
flicts, with armed forces on either side engaged in hostilities-con-
flicts, in short, which are in many respects similar to an interna-
tional war .... ",17 There has been little precedent to define
those terms.
The paucity of precedent on these problems exists in large
part because only the United States and Israel 8 have dealt with
16. "Law of war" is used in U.S. statutes like 10 U.S.C. § 821, which concerns "of-
fenses that by... the law of war may be tried by military commissions," and case law like
Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). Although there may be nuances in the terminology,
this presentation assumes that the "law of war" and the "law of armed conflict" are the
same. For collectors of military acronyms, the Armed Forces sometimes refer to the
"law of armed conflict as LOAC. See Rod Powers, Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC),
http://usmilitary.about.com/cs/wars/a/loac.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2007).
17. III JEAN DE PPEUX, COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST
1949, at 37 (trans. A.P. de Henry, 1960) (emphasis in original).
18. On December 11, 2006, the Israeli Supreme Court upheld certain targeted
killings by Israeli Defense Forces on the basis that:
Between Israel and the various terrorist organizations active inJudea, Samaria,
and the Gaza Strip .. .a continuous situation of armed conflict has existed
since the first intifada. The Supreme Court has discussed the existence of that
conflict in a series of judgments (see HCJ 9255/00 El Saka v. The State of Israel
(unpublished); HCJ 2461/01 Kna'an v. The Commander of IDFForces in the Judea
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terrorism as "armed conflict." Accordingly, only they have had
to deal with the application of the Conventions to terrorism.
Other countries steer far away from applying the "armed
conflict" label to terrorism or any internal conflict and thus seek
to avoid consequent recourse to the Conventions. t9 They are as-
sisted in this approach by the 1977 Protocol II to the Conven-
tions.2 ° Protocol II is decidedly limiting when applied to terror-
ism. In order for Protocol II to apply in non-international
armed conflict, the non-State opponents must be "dissident
armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under re-
sponsible command, exercise such control over a part of [the
State's] territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and
concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol."
21
It has been cynically suggested (well before 9/11) that Protocol
II was ratified so soon by so many countries precisely because
that limiting definition suited their convenience in keeping dis-
tance between their internal conflicts and the Protocols and
and Samaria Area (unpublished); HCJ 9293/01 Barake v. The Minister of Defense,
56(2) PD 509; HCJ 3114/02 Barakev. The Minister of Defense, 56(3) PD 11; HCJ
3451/02 Almandi v. The Minster of Defense, 56(3) PD 30 (hereinafter "Al-
mandi"); HCJ 8172/02 Ibrahim v. The Commander of lDF Forces in the West Bank
(unpublished); HCJ 7957/04 Mara'abe v. The Prime Minister of Israel (unpub-
lished, hereinafter - Mara'abe). In one case I [A. Barak] wrote: "Since late
September 2000, severe combat has been taking place in the areas of Judea
and Samaria. It is not police activity. It is an armed conflict" (HCJ 7015/02
Ajuri v. The Military Commander of the Judea and Samaria Area, 56(6) PD 352,
358; hereinafter "Ajuri."
HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Gov't of Israel [2005], 1 16, availa-
ble at http://elyonl.court.gov.il/Files_.ENG/02/690/007/a34/02007690.a34.HTM.
19. See id. 11 29-37; see also Jennifer Van Thiel, Good for the Nation, Good for the
Administration: Why the Courts Should Hear the Guantanamo Bay Detainee Cases and How It
Will Have Positive Effects, 27 WHITrIER L. REV 867, 868 (2006) (discussing the arbitrary
classification of detainees and the escape routes to avoid prosecution under laws gov-
erning armed conflicts).
20. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relat-
ing to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts ("Protocol II"),
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Protocol II]. The United States is neither
a party to Protocol II, nor to the accompanying Protocol I, but it accepts much of the
Protocols as customary law. See Rawcliffe, supra note 5, at 25 n.13.
21. Protocol II, supra note 20, art. 1, 1. Paragraph 2 goes on to specify that
"[t] his Protocol shall not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such
as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, as not
being armed conflicts." Id. art. 1, 2. Putting the two paragraphs together, Paragraph
1 relates to armed conflicts to which the Protocol applies, while Paragraph 2 describes
situations that are not armed conflict. The Protocol does not characterize cases falling
between these definitions, which may or may not be armed conflict, but in any event are
apparently outside the scope of the Protocol as per Paragraph 1.
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Conventions. 22 While the Protocols expressly do not limit the
application of the Conventions proper, they may well influence
interpretation or contribute toward the understanding of
"armed conflict" under customary international law.23
The Protocols did not, however, influence the view of
armed conflict by the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia when, in the appeal in the case of Prosecutor v.
Tadic, it held "an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort
to armed force between States or protracted armed violence be-
tween governmental authorities and organized armed groups or
between such groups within a State."2 4 It came as no surprise
when the Tribunal found that the Bosnian hostilities "ex-
ceed(ed) the intensity requirements applicable to both interna-
tional and internal armed conflicts."2 5 Yet, the Tribunal also
could have found that the opposing forces passed the test of Pro-
tocol II, based on the control each had over territory and the
extent of military organization.
It would be difficult to find a terrorist network meeting the
Protocol's test. Terrorists tend to be short on territorial control.
Nor is it likely, outside of Iraq and Afghanistan, that terrorist
operations would be intense and prolonged under the Tadic
wording, unless all such operations were globally aggregated, as
the Bush Administration seeks to do.
Reviewing post-9/11 developments against these concepts
of armed conflict, there have been at least three very different
phases. The first of these was the full-scale offensives initially
conducted in Afghanistan and Iraq, engaging the entire reper-
toire of military power in the air and on the ground, and even
naval air support from aircraft carriers and from ships launching
cruise missiles. This phase was treated by the United States as
armed conflict between State parties-and properly so.
The second phase consists of ongoing asymmetric opera-
22. See George H. Aldrich, The Law of War on Land, 94 AMER. J. INT'L L. 42, 59-61
(2000) (discussing the faults of Protocol II).
23. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(f), July 1, 2002,
2187 U.N.T.S. 90. Article 8(f) states that the article for certain war crimes in non-inter-
national armed conflict "applies to armed conflicts that take place in the territory of a
State when there is protracted armed conflict between governmental authorities and
organized armed groups or between such groups."
24. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT 94-1, Decision on the Defense Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 70 (Oct. 2, 1995).
25. Id.
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tions in the same countries. These operations have been con-
ducted by U.S.-led coalitions with armor, artillery, and air sup-
port, often on a battalion or higher scale (even assaults against
entire towns, as in Falluja, Iraq), against insurgents themselves
using sophisticated explosive devices, mortars, and automatic
weapons.26 These high-intensity and prolonged campaigns are,
the author submits, "armed conflict" even if the opponents fail
to meet the Protocol II definition without territorial control.
Meanwhile, the Administration has applied the same legal
concepts to a third level of activity: Efforts to suppress individual
terrorists or small groups of terrorists in the United States and
third countries with, in almost all cases, arrests by civilian law
enforcement authorities, most often foreign authorities. While
F-16s circle from time to time over our cities, Coast Guard cut-
ters cruise our harbors, and the National Guard patrols transpor-
tation hubs, there have been no terrorists or suspects appre-
hended in the United States by the Armed Forces. For example,
Jose Padilla wound up in a Navy brig only after arrest at O'Hare
and initial detention by civilian authority.27 The weapons fa-
vored by terrorists are the traditional stuff of terrorism aug-
mented by dramatic innovations such as the 9/11 attack, but
rarely involving military armament. In other words, they look
familiar in terms of the Oklahoma City bombing, or the exper-
iences of Britain with the Irish Republican Army ("IRA"), or
Spain with the Basque insurgents-that is, classic terrorism and
antiterrorism. To the extent that these events do not involve
"armed forces" on both sides (or perhaps on either side) en-
gaged in "hostilities" as understood by Pictet, or the intensity or
duration sought by Tadic, not to mention insurgent territorial
control under Protocol II, these situations would be excluded
from "armed conflict" under the Conventions and customary in-
ternational law.
Do the horrifying destruction wreaked on 9/11, the terrible
casualties in Madrid, London, and Bali and the potentially even
more awesome threat of weapons of mass destruction, on top of
26. Dexter Filkins & Robert F. Worth, The Conflict in Iraq: The Overview; U.S.-led
Assault Marks Advance Against Falluja, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2004, at Al.
27. See Tony Karon, Person of the Week: Jose Padilla, TIME, June 14, 2002 (stating that
Padilla, a U.S. citizen, was being held in a Navy brig as an "enemy combatant"); see also
Jessica Reaves, How Long Can We Detain the Alleged "Dirty Bomber?", TIME, June 13, 2002
(describing the conditions surrounding Jose Padilla's arrest and detainment).
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global networking, change the situation so drastically as to turn
the current species of terrorism into "armed conflict" subject to
the Conventions? Soon after 9/11 the world seemed to agree
that something new had happened, which foreign and interna-
tional leaders were prepared to agree with the United States was
equivalent to war.
As noted above, however, other governments have not taken
the same legal approach as the United States, nor would they
have, in all likelihood, had they fallen victim to an attack on the
scale of 9/11. Protocol II, to which most States are parties, nar-
rowly defines "armed conflict," and States don't necessarily want
to expand that definition. Whatever the reasons for that view,
the Bush Administration saw the matter quite differently within
the context of the U.S. legal system.
Approaching the situation as "armed conflict" arguably of-
fers two legal advantages to the government not otherwise con-
stitutionally available in the United States: detention of "com-
batants" without trial for the duration of the conflict, and trial by
military commission under open-ended rules of procedure and
evidence without civilian juries. Armed conflict has also been
used in Israel to support the legality of targeted killings of ter-
rorists.2" Once these definitions are accepted, detention of com-
batants is claimed to be consistent with the laws and customs of
war, while those same laws and customs, including GC III, are
said to exclude terrorists from POW status as unlawful combat-
ants, given their failure to satisfy the prerequisites of fighting
openly in uniform and honoring those laws and customs. 29
Thus, in the Administration's view, the captor could have his
cake and eat it too-indefinite detention without either trial or
POW status. Indeed, when the government desires trial, it can
cite the Quinn decision"° from World War II to support the le-
gality of military commissions to try unlawful combatants, even
citizens, without regard to trial byjury-simply define terrorism
28. See HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Gov't of Israel [2005],
available at http://elyonl.court.gov.il/FilesENG/02/690/007/a34/02007690.a34.
HTM.
29. See Third Convention, supra note 4, art. 4(A). Persons who are excluded from
POW status are "civilians" under the Fourth Convention, although not subject to the
full protection thereof while taking an active part in hostilities. What it means to take
"an active part in hostilities" is highly controversial and the primary reason for the U.S.
refusal to join Protocol II.
30. SeeExparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
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as "armed conflict" and terrorist suspects as "unlawful combat-
ants." Moreover, the rubric of armed conflict or war opens the
door to the targeting of individual enemy combatants and the
assertion of broad wartime powers of the President as Com-
mander-in-Chief.8 1
III. COMMON ARTICLE 3
Yet the same definitions that are so convenient for asserting
executive power also open the door to the Conventions, at least
Common Article 3, which other countries had avoided in their
counterterrorism campaigns. The ongoing and future struggle
against terrorism is unlikely to resume the form of State vs. State
conflict. Probably it will resemble either the current phases in
Iraq and Afghanistan or more likely the more or less classic anti-
terrorism described above. In these phases the application of
the Conventions turns on the meaning of Common Article 3's
reference to "armed conflict not of an international character
occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Par-
ties," if it is armed conflict at all.3 2
For almost five years after 9/11, the Bush Administration
was able to resist application of Common Article 3 by arguing
that the war on terrorism was "international in scope" and thus
not within that Article.33 This interpretation opened a gap be-
tween the main text of the Conventions for armed conflict be-
31. The Administration's arguments emphasize both the unprecedented nature of
al-Qaeda's terrorism and the precedented basis for use of the law of armed conflict. On
both aspects, consider the precedent of the 1916 raid on a U.S. border town and its
Army post by more than 500 "unlawful combatants" for the express purpose of killing
Americans and inflicting terror. They killed ten civilians (including men brutally exe-
cuted in front of their families) and thirteen soldiers, and wounded more. President
Woodrow Wilson responded with a punitive expedition of three cavalry and two infan-
try regiments (much of the available mobile regular army), supported with the latest
technology (trucks and biplanes), to pursue the terrorists into the Mexican deserts and
mountains. The newly created National Guard was called up along the border in sup-
port. Attacked by both sides of the Mexican revolution, the U.S. expedition failed to
catch the charismatic leader, Pancho Villa, but captured some of his followers. The
captives were not tried by military commission, court martial, or even federal court;
they were turned over to state courts, tried for murder, and some were executed.
Others were pardoned by the Governor of New Mexico on the grounds that they acted
as soldiers under orders. See generally EILEEN WELSOME, THE GENERAL AND THE JAGUAR:
PERSHING'S HUNT FOR PANCHO VILLA-A TRUE STORY OF REVOLUTION AND REVENGE 111-
135, 157-224, 233, 237-259, 263-269, 326 (2006).
32. See Third Convention, supra note 4, art. 3.
33. See Geoffrey S. Corn, Hamdan, Common Article 3 and the True Spirit of the Law of
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tween States parties and Common Article 3, a legal "black hole."
That gap was closed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Hamdan when
it found the Article's "conflict not of an international character"
to be used "in contradistinction to a conflict between nations.""
In this view, all armed conflict is either subject to the full Con-
ventions or to Common Article 3-there is no gap. As will be
shown, Congress relieved the Bush Administration's anxiety
about the consequences of this outcome to some degree, while
leaving the interpretation of the Article as the Court declared it.
Meanwhile, the characterization of armed conflict was not
addressed by the Court. The opinions in Hamdan assume that
the underlying situation is "armed conflict," as apparently did
the parties. Detainees like Salim Ahmad Hamdan captured early
in the Afghan conflict and seeking application of the full terms
of GC III or at least Common Article 3 certainly had no interest
in that context in disclaiming the existence of armed conflict,
while the Bush Administration obviously had to maintain that
view in order to support detention and trial by military commis-
sion. Nor would an Afghan detainee have likely prevailed on
this issue, given the intensity of that conflict at the times in ques-
tion and arguably still today.
It may be a different matter whether defendants appre-
hended in other countries and situations and charged with ter-
rorism of a more classic nature will be able to contest the charac-
terization of their activities as included in "armed conflict." One
might anticipate pleadings that the offenses charged were not
"violations of the law of war," and the defendants were not "com-
batants" and did not engage in "hostilities," such that they could
be held as "unlawful combatants" or tried by military commis-
sion. 5
War, JURIST, July 3, 2006, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2006/07/hamdan-com-
mon-article-3-and-true.php (last visited Apr. 10, 2007).
34. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2795 (2006).
35. Apart from the Conventions, the existence of "armed conflict" could be of
constitutional dimension for a non-citizen apprehended in the United States and thus
entitled to constitutional rights, unlike non-citizens not within the country. See United
States v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950). The Quirin exception to the Sixth Amend-
ment right to trial by jury applies to "unlawful combatants" charged with violation of
the "laws of war." Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). The courts control those defini-
tions for constitutional purposes, which are not changed by recent legislation. Defend-
ants might also seek extension of the Rasul treatment of Guantanamo as effective U.S.
territory to limit Eisentrager's exclusion of constitutional rights for non-citizens abroad.
See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
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This discussion of the legal concept of "armed conflict" is
not relevant to United States policy that the Armed Forces apply
the law of war "during all armed conflicts, however such conflicts
are characterized, and in all other military operations."36 Of
course, that policy begs the question of what law of war is appli-
cable in particular circumstances.
IV. IMPACT OF THE MILITARY COMMISSIONS ACT
Whatever the prospects of such defenses may have been, ex-
cept in the constitutional context,' they will now be measured
against the MC Act.37 Controversial provisions relating to the
Conventions include (a) the definitions of lawful and unlawful
combatants and the procedure for determining such status,38
(b) exclusion of the Conventions as a source of rights,39 (c)
amendments to the War Crimes Act,4" and (d) the procedures
established for military commissions.4"
A. Definitions of Combatants
The MC Act defines "lawful combatant" in terms paraphras-
ing Article 4(A) of GC III prescribing the categories of persons
qualifying for treatment as POWs.4 2 Unfortunately, the statutory
36. Dep't of Def., Directive 2311.01E, DOD Law of War Program § 4.1 (2006),
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/d231 1l01e.pdf.
37. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006).
38. Id. § 3, 120 Stat. at 2601 (adding 10 U.S.C. § 948a(1)-(2)).
39. Id. § 3, 120 Stat. at 2602 (adding 10 U.S.C. § 948b(g)).
40. Id. § 6(a)-(b), 120 Star. at 2632-36 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2006)).
41. Id. § 3, 120 Stat. at 2608-19 (adding 10 U.S.C. § 949).
42. The MC Act states:
The term 'lawful enemy combatant' means a person who is (A) a member of
the regular forces of a State party engaged in hostilities against the United
States; (B) a member of a militia, volunteer corps, or organized resistance
movement belonging to a State party engaged in such hostilities, which are
under responsible command, wear a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a
distance, carry their arms openly, and abide by the law of war; or (C) a mem-
ber of a regular armed force who professes allegiance to a government en-
gaged in such hostilities, but not recognized by the United States.
Id. § 3, 120 Stat. at 2601 (adding 10 U.S.C. § 948a(2)). This is similar to GC III's Article
4 definition of a "prisoner of war," which states:
Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are persons belong-
ing to one of the following categories, who have fallen into the power of the
enemy: 1. Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict as well as
members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces. 2.
Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including
those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict
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text changes those categories in subtle, but significant, respects
from the treaty text." The Convention's first category of POW-
qualifiers includes "members of the armed forces of a Party to
the conflict as well as members of militias or volunteer corps forming
part of such armed forces."" By contrast, the statute relegates mem-
bers of militias or volunteer corps to a second category, where
they become subject to the four qualifying tests of (i) responsi-
ble command, (ii) having fixed distinctive signs (sometimes
called fighting in uniform), (iii) carrying arms openly, and (iv)
conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and cus-
toms of war.45 Under the treaty, militiamen run the gauntlet of
such tests only if they do not form part of the State party's armed
forces. This distinction is critical to the Taliban, whose combat-
and operating in or outside their own territory, even if this territory is occu-
pied, provided that such militias or volunteer corps, including such organized
resistance movements, fulfill the following conditions: (a) That of being com-
manded by a person responsible for his subordinates; (b) That of having a
fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; (c) That of carrying arms
openly; (d) That of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws
and customs of war. 3. Members of regular armed forces who profess alle-
giance to a government or an authority not recognized by the Detaining
Power. 4. Persons who accompany the armed forces without actually being
members thereof, such as civilian members of military aircraft crews, war cor-
respondents, supply contractors, members of labour units or of services re-
sponsible for the welfare of the armed forces, provided that they have received
authorization from the armed forces which they accompany, who shall provide
them for that purpose with an identity card similar to the annexed model. 5.
Members of crews, including masters, pilots and apprentices, of the merchant
marine and the crews of civil aircraft of the Parties to the conflict, who do not
benefit by more favourable treatment under any other provisions of interna-
tional law. 6. Inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on the approach of
the enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces, without
having had time to form themselves into regular armed units, provided they
carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs of war."
Third Convention, supra note 4, art. 4.
43. Compare the MC Act's definition to the Israeli statutory definition of "unlawful
combatant" for purposes of administrative detention by the Israeli Defense Forces:
[A] person who took part in hostilities against the State of Israel, whether
directly or indirectly, or is part of a force which commits hostilities against the
state of Israel, who does not fulfill the conditions granting prisoner of war
status in international humanitarian law, as determined in article 4 of III Ge-
neva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August
1949.
The Imprisonment of Unlawful Combatants Law, 5762-2002, - LSI - (2002) (Isr.).
The cross-reference in that statute avoids the garbled definition in the MC Act. See
Military Commissions Act of 2006, § 3, 120 Stat. at 2601 (adding 10 U.S.C. § 948a(2)).
44. Third Convention, supra note 4, art. 4(1) (emphasis added).
45. Id. art. 4(2).
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ants might conceivably be "regulars" or militias forming part of
the Afghan armed forces, in which case they would not be sub-
ject under the treaty to the four tests as the Administration con-
tends and the statute provides. It has even been argued that
"foreign" infantry units were sufficiently integrated into the
Taliban to escape the four tests,4 6 a contention the author lacks
sufficient facts to evaluate.
Under the MC Act, an unlawful combatant is essentially a
person engaged in hostilities with the United States or its allies
or who has purposefully and materially supported such hostili-
ties and is not a lawful combatant. Members of the Taliban or al-
Qaeda are defined per se as unlawful combatants. For them, the
subtleties of defining lawful combatants do not matter; their sta-
tus is sealed. Moreover, the definition includes as an unlawful
combatant a person found by a Combatant Status Review Tribu-
nal (or other competent tribunal) to be an unlawful combatant.
In other words, if the government concludes you are an unlawful
combatant, you are. End of story.
Well, not exactly. Because if you are a lawful combatant
under the Conventions entitled to POW status under the view
described above (for example, a Taliban infantryman), trial by
military commission would arguably be a "grave breach" of the
Third Convention. That is in turn a felony under the War
Crimes Act, even as amended by the MC Act.4 7 It is a fine point
of law how a defendant could assert such an argument. Suffice it
to say that the JAG officer serving as the law judge of a military
commission might well find a way to avoid his personal commis-
sion of a felony by adjudicating that issue.
A subtle related issue is whether, notwithstanding the MC
Act's jurisdictional definitions of unlawful combatantcy, a defen-
dant could challenge his defined status solely for purposes of
46. See Letter from Kenneth Roth, Executive Director, Human Rights Watch, to
Condoleeza Rice, National Security Advisor (Jan. 28, 2002), http://www.hrw.org/
press/2002/01 /us01 2802-1tr.pdf. The letter states that:
[T]his four-part test would not apply to members of the Taliban's armed
forces, since the Taliban, as the de facto government of Afghanistan, was a
Party to the Geneva Convention. The four-part test would also not apply to
militia that were integrated into the Taliban's armed forces, such as, perhaps,
the Taliban's "55th Brigade," which we understand to have been composed of
foreign troops fighting as part of the Taliban.
47. War Crimes Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-192, 110 Stat 2104 (1996) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. 2441 (2004)).
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asserting the "combatant's privilege" against a charge of murder
or assault in combat against otherwise lawful targets. While stat-
utory definitions for purposes ofjurisdiction may escape the con-
stitutional rules against bills of attainder and ex post facto laws,4 8
defining a crime or excluding a defense against a crime retroac-
tively and as to members of named organizations would be an
unconstitutional ex post facto law and possibly a bill of attainder.
Whether Guantanamo detainees could raise that assertion of un-
constitutionality may be a different matter from whether they
are constitutionally entitled to habeas corpus.4 9
Bear in mind that advocates for a detainee could only claim
POW status as a member of regular armed forces or a militia
forming part of such forces. Detainees who deny any combatant
status and are not charged with activities even arguably involving
such forces or militias could not prevail on such claims.
B. Exclusion of the Conventions as Sources of Rights
Section 5(a) of the MC Act excludes recourse to the Con-
ventions as a source of rights in United States litigation to which
the Government or its personnel are parties.50 Put another way,
the Conventions are now clearly not "self-executing." That
much controverted issue had been finessed in Hamdan, which
addressed the Conventions not as a direct source of rights but as
an essential statutory element of the law of war referenced in the
UCMJ.5' The amendments effected by the MC Act removed the
statutory basis for the Court's invocation of the Conventions
through the UCMJ, while the Act simultaneously eliminates the
argument in favor of self-execution. Much as advocates for
human rights will regret that outcome, they will be hard pressed
to find any legal objection to the effectiveness of this legislation.
A different matter is the bootstrapping declaration of Sec-
tion 6(a) (2) that the provisions of the MC Act "fully satisfy" the
48. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (stating that "no bill of attainder or ex post facto
Law shall be passed").
49. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 464 F. Supp. 2d. 9, 19 n.15 (D.D.C. 2006) (stating
that "[m]y ruling does not address whether and to what extent enemy aliens may invoke
other constitutional rights; I find only that the Suspension Clause does not guarantee
the right to petition for habeas corpus to non-resident enemy aliens captured and de-
tained outside the United States.").
50. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 5(a), 120 Stat. 2600,
2631 (2006).
51. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2794 (2006).
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United States obligation to implement GC III to provide penal
sanctions for grave breaches (once again ignoring GC IV and the
other two Conventions) and the mandate that "[n]o foreign or
international source of law shall supply a basis for a rule or deci-
sion in the courts of the United States in interpreting the
prohibitions enumerated in" the amendments of the War
Crimes Act discussed below.5 2 It is one thing to debate the influ-
ence of foreign precedent on United States domestic law, but
the exclusion of international sources to understand a statute
implementing an international obligation is absurd. To the ex-
tent that these extraordinary provisions interfere with judicial in-
dependence they raise constitutional issues of the separation of
the branches beyond the scope of this Essay.
C. Cutting Back the War Crimes Act
Further, Section 6 amends the War Crimes Act retroactively
to November 26, 1997 (the date when the War Crimes Act was
amended to criminalize violation of Common Article 3)53 to re-
place any violation of Common Article 3 as a defined felony with
certain "grave breaches" of that Article. The MC Act's concept
of grave breaches is based on Article 130 of GC III and compara-
ble provisions of the other Conventions which call for severe
punishment of violations of that treaty's core provisions (not in-
cluding Common Article 3).54
It took the United States a long time to implement its obli-
gation under Article 129 "to enact legislation necessary to pro-
vide effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or order-
ing to be committed, any of the grave breaches of the present
Convention defined in the following Article."5 5 In 1996, the War
Crimes Act was passed (unanimously in the Senate and by voice
vote in the House), criminalizing grave breaches defined in the
Conventions.5 6 In 1997, as noted above, the statute's scope was
greatly expanded to, among other things, make any violation of
52. Military Commissions Act of 2006, § 6(a) (2), 120 Stat. at 2632.
53. See Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropria-
tions Act, Fiscal Year 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-118, § 583, 111 Stat. 2386, 2436 (1997).
54. Compare Military Commissions Act of 2006, § 6(b) (1) (B), 120 Stat. at 2633-35,
with Third Convention, supra note 4, art. 130.
55. Third Convention, supra note 4, art. 129.
56. See R. Jeffrey Smith, Detainee Abuse Charges Feared: Shield Sought from 1996 War
Crimes Act, WASH. POST, July 28, 2006, at Al.
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Common Article 3 a felony.57
When the Supreme Court in Hamdan surprised the Admin-
istration by holding that Common Article 3 applied in the Af-
ghan campaign, and presumably throughout armed conflict in
the war on terror, 8 there was much angst over the risk that
United States personnel, notably CIA operatives, might be ex-
posed to prosecution under the War Crimes Act for their inter-
rogation practices arguably violating Common Article 3, espe-
cially "outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating
and degrading treatment."59
To reduce that exposure, the MC Act stepped back from
making any violation of Common Article 3 a felony and substi-
tuted certain "grave breaches" of that Article.6" Aside from cov-
ering the obviously severe offenses of "torture," "murder,"
"rape," and "hostage taking," among others, as grave breaches,
the MC Act addresses "cruel or inhuman treatment."61 In doing
so, the terms "outrages upon personal dignity," "humiliating,"
and "degrading" as used in Common Article 3, vanish; instead
"cruel or inhuman treatment" becomes infliction of "severe or
serious physical or mental pain or suffering," which terms are
further defined to exclude even the most extreme humiliation
that does not inflict physical pain.62 Further, the Act effectively
immunizes pre-enactment conduct that inflicted pain, even se-
vere pain, that was not prolonged.63 Finally, the amendments
57. See id.
58. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2794-99 (2006).
59. Third Convention, supra note 4, art. 3.
60. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 6(a)(2), 120 Stat.
2600, 2632 (2006). The MC Act authorizes the President to deal administratively with
violations of treaty obligations that are not "grave breaches." Id. § 6(a) (3) (A), 120 Stat.
at 2632.
61. Id. § 6(b)(1), 120 Stat. at 2633.
62. Third Convention, supra note 4, art. 3; see Military Commissions Act,
§ 6(b)(1) (B), 120 Stat. at 2633.
63. See MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, THE WAR CRIMES Acr: Cuiur" ISSUEs 7 (Cong.
Res. Serv., 2006).
The type of mental pain and suffering constituting cruel treatment generally
differs from the type rising to the level of torture, in that it only needs to be of
a serious and non-transitory nature which need not be prolonged, as opposed to be-
ing of a severe and prolonged nature. However, the War Crimes Act, as
amended, provides that with respect to conduct occurring before enactment of
the Military Commissions Act, such pain and suffering must be of a prolonged
nature.
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omit trials conducted without the regularly constituted courts
and judicial guarantees required by Common Article 3, a nota-
ble departure from the analogous grave breaches of the main
body of GC III which penalize trials of POWs in violation of the
applicable provisions.6 4
Having narrowed the War Crimes Act to exclude "humilia-
tion" alone as a basis for criminal liability, Section 6(c) then goes
on to reenact, with minor changes, the provisions of the De-
tainee Treatment Act of 200565 in prohibiting (though without
criminal sanction) "cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment", in turn defined to mean "cruel, unusual, and in-
humane treatment or punishment" prohibited by the Fifth,
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.66 This prohibition is to
be enforced by the President administratively. 67
Section 6(b) (3) problematically excludes liability under the
War Crimes Act for "collateral damage" in violation of Common
Article 3. "Collateral damage" is not defined. If it is understood
as the unintended damage inflicted on civilians and their prop-
erty as a result of otherwise lawful attacks, the exclusion is under-
standable. If, however, it excludes all damage related to attacks,
lawful or unlawful, the exclusion would be extreme and inconsis-
tent with long-standing United States policy. Despite this troub-
lesome definition, the exclusion may be of little relevance in
practice for the military, the most likely perpetrator of collateral
damage, which as noted below customarily charges its members
with offenses under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, not
the War Crimes Act.
D. Military Commissions
The MC Act's provisions for military commissions are cov-
ered in this Colloquium by Prof. Trahan in her Article and will
64. See Third Convention, supra note 4, art. 102.
A prisoner of war can be validly sentenced only if the sentence has been pro-
nounced by the same courts according to the same procedure as in the case of
members of the armed forces of the Detaining Power, and if, furthermore, the
provisions of the present Chapter have been observed.
Id.; see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BRIEFING PAPER ON U.S. MILITARY COMMISSIONS (June 25,
2003), available at http://hrw.org/backgrounder/usa/military-commissions.pdf.
65. Pub. L. No. 109-163, Title IX, § 1403, 119 Stat. 3136, 3475 [hereinafter
"DTA'].
66. Military Commissions Act, § 6(c) (2), 120 Stat. at 2635.
67. See id. § 6(c)(3), 120 Stat. at 2635.
526 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURAAL [Vol. 30:509
not be covered in detail here.68 With respect to Common Article
3's requirement of a "regularly constituted court affording all
the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by
civilized people,"69 in the author's view, the statutory authoriza-
tion of military commissions satisfies that requirement for a "reg-
ularly constituted court." The commissions are as regular in this
respect as courts martial (which are convened ad hoc by com-
manders for specific defendants and specific charges) and no
more "irregular" than ad hoc tribunals like the Hague tribunals
for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, considered to be valid
under international law and presumably to be regularly consti-
tuted. Whether commission procedures provide sufficient judi-
cial guaranties is an altogether different matter.
The key procedural defect on which the Court in Hamdan
found commissions to violate Common Article 3, the inability of
the defendant to be privy to the evidence against him, has been
substantially corrected by the MC Act.7" Judge Robertson, who
issued the original decision in favor of Salim Ahmed Hamdi,
considered that Congress has acted "according to the guidelines
laid down by the Supreme Court" and found it "difficult to see
how continued habeas jurisdiction could make further improve-
ments in his tribunal."7 " While other objections have been
raised (including before this Colloquium) to procedures for
commissions that differ from those for courts martial, without
discussing those objections fully here the author suggests that it
may now be time to allow the commissions to proceed and estab-
lish a trial record on which the fairness of their procedures as
applied can be assessed. For example, the MC Act requires con-
sideration of the reliability and probative value of the hearsay
evidence to which a party objects.72 It is doubtful that United
States jury-based rules of evidence on hearsay or other matters
are internationally required, provided that the commission gives
the required consideration to reliability. A major change from
68. See Jennifer Trahan, Military Commission Trials at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba: Do
They Satisfy International and Constitutional Law?, 30 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 780, (2007).
69. Third Convention, supra note 4, art. 3.
70. See Military Commissions Act, § 3, 120 Stat. at 2608-09 (adding 10 U.S.C.
§ 949a(b) (1)).
71. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 464 F. Supp. 2d. 9, 18 (D.D.C. 2006).
72. Military Commissions Act § 3, 120 Stat. at 2609 (adding 10 U.S.C.
§ 949a(b) (2) (E) (ii)).
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the original commission procedures permits judicial review up
to the Supreme Court.7 1 Counsel for defendants (and likely
amzci such as some participants in this Colloquium) will have
much to say when that time comes.
V. SCREENING BY COMPETENT TRIBUNALS
Article 5 of GC III provides that "[s] hould any doubt arise as
to whether persons, having committed a belligerent act and hav-
ing fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to any of the
categories enumerated in Article 4, such persons shall enjoy the
protection of the present Convention until such time as their
status has been determined by a competent tribunal. '74 As Arti-
cle 5 has been implemented by the United States and other
countries, such tribunals are not, nor do they resemble, courts,
courts martial or military commissions. They provide field
screening in a quick and summary manner not comparable to
United States judicial proceedings, including habeas corpus.
The United States used such Article 5 tribunals to resolve
the individual status of purported POWs in the Iraqi invasion,
where POW status was conceded to members of the Iraqi armed
forces,7 5 but not in the Afghan conflict to determine whether
Guantanamo or other detainees should enjoy POW status. The
predicate for that decision as to Afghanistan was the Presidential
finding that members of the Taliban or al-Qaeda could not qual-
ify for POW status because of the overall failure of those forces
to meet the supposedly applicable tests of Article 4 of GC III.
Accordingly, "no doubt could arise" as to POW status.
Criticism of the lack of screening under Article 5, or its im-
plementing United States Army Regulation, AR 190-8,6 comes
73. See id. § 3, 120 Stat. at 2622 (adding § 950g).
74. Third Convention, supra note 4, art. 5.
75. See, e.g., Press Release, Human Rights First, Human Rights First Urges United
States to Refrain from Transferring War Captives Outside Iraq: Geneva Conventions
Prohibit Transfer and Set Trial Requirements (Apr. 8, 2003), http://www.humanrights
first.org/media/2003_alerts/0408.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2007).
76. Dep't of the Army, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian In-
terests and Other Detainees, Army Reg. 190-8 (1997) [hereinafter AR 190-8], available
at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/law/arl90-8.pdf. The regulation was
adopted by the Army as AR 190-8 and by the other Armed Services. Tribunals under
this regulation consist of three officers, one of field grade (major or above), with a
fourth officer, preferably a military lawyer, as recorder. The record is reviewed by the
next higher military lawyer. Decision is based on a preponderance of the evidence.
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from two directions. (a) First, there is substantive disagreement
with the characterization of the Taliban and al-Qaeda. As dis-
cussed above, that characterization is problematic at least as to
the Taliban." Accordingly, any detainee known to be a member
of the Taliban arguably should have had POW status (without
the need for a tribunal); if his membership in the Taliban were
factually in doubt, that status should have been determined by a
competent tribunal. (b) Second, it is argued procedurally that
only an Article 5 tribunal, not the Administration (or even the
President) could determine the status of the Taliban. Many ob-
servers have insisted that general principles of law and policy re-
quire at least minimal due process to hold a detainee indefi-
nitely without criminal charges. Some have argued in favor of
holding "competent tribunals" to determine detainee status,78
while others have objected that such screening proceedings as
have been held are woefully inadequate.79
On the first point, as to the literal terms of Article 5, from
the author's limited knowledge of the particulars of the Taliban
forces, they seem to have been the regular army of Afghanistan
to the extent that the Taliban government was the de facto gov-
ernment. However, it does not necessarily follow that it was pro-
cedurally improper for the United States to determine their col-
lective status at the highest level of government and not in Arti-
cle 5 tribunals. It can be argued that a theater commander with
legal advice and resources at his command (and a fortiori, the
President with the legal apparatus available to him) is far better
positioned than a few middle level officers in the field to deter-
mine the status of an enemy force involving complex questions
of international law and possibly the use of highly classified intel-
ligence information about that force. Moreover, the treatment
of members of a large force should be uniform and not depen-
Detainees may present evidence, but the military does not provide counsel for the de-
tainee, nor is their any reference to civilian defense counsel. The tribunals determine
status, not culpability for any offense. See id. chs. 1-6.
77. See supra Part IV.A.
78. See, e.g., Douglas W. Kmiec, Observing the Separation of Powers: The President's War
Power Necessarily Remains The Power To Wage War Successfully, 53 DRAKE L. REv. 851, 888
(2005); Paul Rosenzweig, On Liberty and Terror in the Post-9/11 World: A Response to Profes-
sor Chemerinsky, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 29, 38 (2005).
79. See Joseph Blocher, Comment, Combatant Status Review Tribunals: Hawed An-
swers to the Wrong Question, 116 YALE L.J. 667 (2006).
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dent upon the variable determinations of diverse tribunals.8"
The author argues that, once such a determination has been
made at a theater or national level, doubt has been resolved for
purposes of Article 5 unless an individual detainee claims that he
was a member of a unique organization not covered by the
global finding, in which case a tribunal should resolve that
claim. If there were an enemy force qualifying for POW status,
the role of Article 5 tribunals would be to determine whether a
given detainee was in fact a member of that force. Absent a
force qualifying for POW status, there is no POW determination
to make. The author thus objects not to the President's proce-
dure, but to the substantive outcome of that procedure.
As to the members of al-Qaeda, similar questions arise re-
garding those allegedly members of units integrated with the Af-
ghan armed forces. However, al-Qaeda members not so en-
gaged would be subject to the four tests of Article 4 and, it
seems, al-Qaeda would fail those tests beyond doubt. Thus, the
author sees no need for Article 5 tribunals for such persons. As
to detainees in the war on terror outside the Afghan and Iraq
conflicts, GC III would not apply (other than Common Article 3)
and POW status would not be possible. Therefore, no Article 5
tribunals would be needed. Thus, even if in principle such tribu-
nals should have been held in Afghanistan, they would have had
little application to most alleged members of al-Qaeda. Detain-
ees not treated as POWs or given hearings before Article 5 tribu-
nals under GC III would be entitled to certain review proceed-
ings under GC IV."1 The right to these proceedings, like most
80. Consider hypothetically if in World War II it had been necessary to determine
the POW status of the German Waffen SS, whose units committed numerous war crimes,
including the murder of U.S. prisoners. Had GC III then applied, should the SS status
have been determined at the field POW collection points or by the high command for
the entire European Theater of Operations? It seems likely that the latter would have
permitted a better informed and considered determination based on intelligence avail-
able at the theater level and greater legal resources. In fact, SS soldiers were treated as
POWs despite their widespread war crimes until, in some cases, their trial for war
crimes. Reportedly, however, many U.S. and Allied soldiers took matters into their own
hands and refused to accept SS surrenders.
81. AR 190-8 requires Article 5 tribunals under GC III to determine the status only
of detainees with potential POW status, but another provision relating to GC IV re-
quires similar boards of officers to hear appeals from orders directing detention of
civilian detainees as "spies or saboteurs," sometimes called security detainees, and peri-
odically to review of their status. See AR 190-8, supra note 76, chs. 5-1 (g). Detention as a
spy or saboteur may be individually ordered by the theater commander without any
proceeding. See Third Convention, supra note 4, art. 5-1 (e).
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issues relating to GC IV, has received little attention from either
the Administration or human rights advocates.
Under pressure from the Hamdi decision, in which Justice
O'Connor invited the Administration to use an Article 5
equivalent, 82 potentially in lieu of habeas corpus, Combatant Sta-
tus Review Tribunals ("CSRTs") were initiated. CSRTs are recog-
nized by the Detainee Treatment Act, which provides limited ju-
dicial review of their decisions.83 Suffice it to say that, as ably
presented by Professor Denbeaux in this Colloquium,84 CSRTs
in practice fell woefully short of any meaningful due process for
indefinite detention without charges. That is not because they
violate either the Conventions or AR 190-8, s5 but because the
Conventions and AR 190-8 do not require due process suitable
for the situation at Guantanamo. The author believes that such
due process cannot be found within the Conventions and can
only be found under the Constitution or a new statutory enact-
ment.
VI. ENFORCEMENT OF THE CONVENTIONS IN COURTS
MARTIAL AND ON CIA PERSONNEL
A few words about the implementation of the Conventions
by the United States Armed Forces are in order. While it is com-
monly understood that the Conventions are the basis for the law
of armed conflict as interpreted by the United States military, it
is also commonly overlooked that personnel charged before
courts martial for what amount to the commission of war crimes
have not been prosecuted under the War Crimes Act. In theory,
the UCMJ permits charges under federal criminal law, like the
War Crimes Act, 6 except for death penalty offenses.8 7 The Af-
82. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 538 (2004).
There remains the possibility that the standards we have articulated could be
met by an appropriately authorized and properly constituted military tribunal.
Indeed, it is notable that military regulations already provide for such process
in related instances, dictating that tribunals be made available to determine
the status of enemy detainees who assert prisoner-of-war status under the Ge-
neva Convention.
83. See DTA, Publ. L. No. 109-163, Title IX, § 1405, 119 Stat. 3136, 3476-80 (2006).
84. See Professor Mark Denbeaux & Christa Boyd-Nafstad, The Attorney Client Rela-
tionship in Guantanamo Bay, 30 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. XXX (2007).
85. See AR 190-8, supra note 76.
86. See 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2007).
87. See 10 U.S.C. § 934 (2007). Under this section, the UCMJ permits court mar-
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ghan and Iraq invasions, as the first large-scale operations since
passage of the War Crimes Act, provided the first opportunities
to test that statute in courts martial. The author is not aware of
any court martial in which the War Crimes Act has been
charged, despite numerous fact patterns indicating violations."
Instead military personnel have been prosecuted for common
criminal offenses defined in the UCMJ, such as murder, rape,
assault, cruelty, disobedience of orders, and even conduct un-
becoming an officer.
Hamdan led to a Department of Defense memorandum and
an ensuing directive89 requiring compliance with Common Arti-
cle 3 "as construed and applied by United States law."9 ° Viola-
tion of the directive might result in a charge of disobedience of
tial charges under federal criminal law unless the offense would be punishable by the
death penalty. Military personnel are also subject to potential trial in federal criminal
court, although that is exceedingly rare.
88. See generally Mynda G. Ohman, Integrating Title 18 War Crimes into Title 10: A
Proposal to Amend the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 57 A.F. L. REv. 1 (2005).
89. See Memorandum from Deputy Sec'y of Def. Gordon England on the Applica-
tion of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to the Treatment of Detainees in
the Dep't of Def. (July 7, 2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/na-
tionalsecurity/genevaconvdoc.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2007); Dep't of Def., Directive
2310.01E, DOD Detainee Program (2006), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/
pubs/pdfs/Detainee_.PrgmDir 2310_9-5-06.pdf. The Directive provides:
2.1 This Directive applies to [in addition to the obvious Department of De-
fense components]:
2.1.2. DoD contractors assigned to or supporting the DOD Components en-
gaged in, conducting, participating in, or supporting detainee operations.
2.1.3 Non-DoD personnel as a condition of permitting access to internment
facilities or to detainees under DoD control ....
4.2 All persons subject to this Directive shall observe the requirements of the
law of war, and shall apply, without regard to a detainee's legal status, at a
minimum the standards articulated in Common Article 3 to the Geneva Con-
ventions of 1949 ... as construed and applied by U.S. law, and those found in
Enclosure 4, in the treatment of all detainees, until their final release, transfer
out of DoD control or repatriation.
Id. §§ 2.1, 2.1.2, 2.1.3, 4.2; see also DEP'T OF THE ARMY, HUMAN INTELLIGENCE COLLEC-
TION OPERATIONS (Field Manual No. 2-22.3, 2006), available at www.fas.org/irp/doddir/
army/fm2-22-3.pdf. In late 2005, the Department rejected a similar determination on
policy grounds. See, e.g. Jane Mayer, The Memo, NEW YORKER, Feb. 27, 2006, at 33.
90. See Dep't of Def., Directive 2310.01E, § 4.2. It might be argued that this refer-
ence incorporates the limitations provided in the War Crimes Act, but as stated in
§ 6(d) (5) of the MC Act, the MC Act does not modify the U.S. obligations under the
Conventions: "The definitions in this subsection are intended only to define the grave
breaches of Common Article 3 and not the full scope of United States' obligations
under that Article." Military Commissions Act, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 6(b) (1) (B), 120
Stat. 2600, 2635 (2006); see 18 U.S.C. § 2441, (3)(D)(5) (2007).
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orders under UCMJ Article 92.91 Thus Common Article 3 indi-
rectly became criminally binding on the Armed Forces, at the
same time that the War Crimes Act was diluted as to the likely
civilian defendants. However, this indirect military effect would
trigger minor penalties. While UCMJ penalties for the more se-
rious common criminal offenses like murder or rape can be se-
vere," including capital punishment, penalties drop to the
equivalent of civilian misdemeanors for certain other offenses
like disobedience of orders.93 The author agrees with the sug-
gestion of Maj. Ohman that the War Crimes Act be enacted as a
punitive article under the UCMJ so that members of the military
could be charged in courts martial with war crimes under that
label and with suitable penalties for the gravity of the offense.94
Personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency will be subject
to the War Crimes Act as amended, which going forward prohib-
its infliction of even briefly experienced severe pain.95 Moreo-
ver, the author submits that the policy of the United States now
forbidding cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, to the ex-
tent prohibited by the Constitution,9 6 will influence the advice
provided by the Agency's in-house counsel, who are regularly
consulted by the operations directorate, and further, that con-
duct contrary to such advice may well be career-terminating for
the participants, whether or not prosecuted. In the real world,
security considerations make it extremely unlikely that CIA per-
sonnel would be prosecuted in federal court, given the security
issues often permitting defendants to "gray mail" their way out of
criminal liability. That does not mean, however, that their be-
havior would not be influenced in other, very practical ways,
91. Disobedience of orders is charged under UCMJ Art. 92, Dereliction of Duty.
See 10 U.S.C.A. § 892. The section says:
Any person subject to this chapter [UCMJ] who- (1) violates or fails to obey
any lawful general order or regulation; (2) having knowledge of any other
lawful order issued by a member of the armed forces, which it is his duty to
obey, fails to obey the order; or (3) is derelict in the performance of his duties;
shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.
92. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2441(a), (d)(1)(D), (d)(1)(G) (2007).
93. See 10 U.S.C. § 892; see also 10 U.S.C. § 934 (2007).
94. See Ohman, supra note 88, at 4, 45, 59-80.
95. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2441 (d) (1) (a), (2) (E) (ii).
96. It was suggested in the Colloquium discussion that the Central Intelligence
Agency ("CIA") had already modified its interrogation practices by February 2006,
shortly after passage of the Detainee Treatment Act and well before the Hamdan deci-
sion.
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such as administrative discipline and unwritten career sanctions.
Apart from those considerations, it is noted that the Department
of Defense Directive described above requiring compliance with
Common Article 3 applies to "non-DOD personnel" (notably
CIA) "assigned to or supporting DOD Components" in detainee
operations. 97
A wild card for the CIA is the passage concurrently with the
MC Act of a statute extending court martial jurisdiction "in time
of declared war or a contingency operation" to "persons serving
with or accompanying an armed force in the field," which would
appear to include notably CIA operatives working with the mili-
tary in situations like those in Afghanistan or Iraq.98 While a
court martial of CIA personnel seems unlikely, its operatives
would be similarly unlikely to want to risk providing the prece-
dent-setting case. Finally, many CIA field operatives are miitary
personnel assigned to the Agency while remaining fully subject
to military justice. It would not be at all surprising to see such
assigned personnel charged before courts martial in appropriate
circumstances.
REPRISE OF UPS AMD DOWNS OF CONVENTION LAW
SINCE 9/11
Where has the roller-coaster ride brought us?
* The MC Act barred private enforcement of the Conventions
and foreclosed the creative indirect use of the Conventions by
the Supreme Court in Hamdan. This result, along with the ex-
clusion of international interpretation of the Conventions from
use in United States courts, is a major disappointment.
* Some see any prospect of criminal prosecution under the
War Crimes Act for detainee abuse for violation of Common Ar-
ticle 3 as diminished by the MC Act's amendments, but before
June's Hamdan decision there was no judicial authority that
Common Article 3 even applied. Thanks to Hamdan, there is a
stronger legal basis now to prosecute egregious conduct than
before Hamdan, despite those cramped amendments.
* Military commissions are back on track. While their proce-
97. Dep't of Def., Directive 2310.01E, §§ 2.1.2, 2.1.3.
98. SeeJohn Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub.
L. 109-364, § 552, 120 Stat. 2083, 2217 (2007).
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dures do not conform to court martial procedures as some had
hoped, they are subject to improved rules including change of
the provision that most troubled the Hamdan plurality, the abil-
ity of defendants to see the evidence against them. Other proce-
dural aspects remain problematic until applied in practice. Mili-
tary commission decisions can be appealed to the federal courts
on the law, where these rules will surely be tested.
* Going forward, the Armed Forces acknowledge full applica-
tion of Common Article 3 to all armed conflict (without modifi-
cation by the MC Act). Yet courts martial have virtually ignored
the Conventions and will likely continue to do so unless violation
of the War Crimes Act becomes a punitive offense under the
UCMJ.
* All United States agencies are subject worldwide to the prohi-
bition of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment violating con-
stitutional standards, which the author submits will have practi-
cal effects despite the lack of criminal penalties under that stan-
dard (except arguably minor penalties for military violation of
the DOD Directive).
* And we have yet to see whether the Administration's view
that the entire war on terror is an armed conflict will prevail.
Without that threshold characterization, the Conventions would
not apply at all, nor would indefinite detention of enemy com-
batants or military commissions. The courts have not yet ad-
dressed this issue in a context other than the Afghan conflict.
Given pending military commission proceedings, court
cases and proposed Congressional reconsideration of the MC
Act, not to mention the overall course of the current conflicts,
the ride is far from over. Buckle your seat belts!
